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1. Introduction 
The United Nations declared 2012 as the International Year of Cooperatives (IYC), highlighting the 
contribution that cooperatives make to global socio-economic development and recognizing their 
impact on poverty reduction and social integration.i In particular, the IYC’s campaign emphasized that 
cooperatives play a central role in rural development and contribute to the marketing of about half of 
global agricultural output. Agricultural cooperatives are thus increasingly recognized as key 
organizational forms for the promotion of inclusive agribusiness through economically profitable and 
socially responsible rural ventures. Cooperatives are expected to play a particularly important role in 
rural Africa where rural institutions and infrastructure remain underdeveloped (Hayami and Otsuka, 
1992). Although agricultural cooperatives are widespread and proliferating across the African 
continent (Develtere et al., 2008), their contribution to the development of inclusive agribusiness 
remains highly contested (World Bank, 2007; Bernard et al., 2008a; Francesconi and Ayerakwa, 2011; 
Francesconi and Heerink, 2010; Francesconi and Ruben, 2014). Many cooperatives appear to be 
dormant or unable to mobilize collective action (World Bank, 2007; Meinzen-Dick, 2009).  
Despite this generally bleak scenario, some African cooperatives do manage to promote 
inclusive agribusiness development. Yet, for every success story there seems to be many failures. Why 
is that so? Arguably, this is because the underlying problems encountered by cooperatives in 
developing countries remain largely unknown (Ostrom, 2004). Due to the lack of cross-fertilization 
between agribusiness and development research, agricultural cooperatives operating in the developing 
world have remained black boxes (Cook and Chaddad, 2000). The need to open these black boxes is 
motivated by numerous studies (see Hayami and Otsuka, 1992; Reardon and Barrett, 2000) suggesting 
that the limited agro-industrialization observed in developing countries can be attributed to the 
excessive attention paid to the development of production technologies and the limited progress made 
in terms of organizational design. 
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Agriculture has always been the dominant sector in the Ghana economy. The sector employs 
about 60 percent of the economically active population and contributes about two-thirds of foreign 
exchange earnings. Staple crops—roots and tubers—contribute about two-thirds of agricultural gross 
domestic product. Cocoa, the largest foreign exchange earner in the sector, contributes 12–13 percent. 
The country has made major efforts since the mid-1980s to diversify into and develop non-traditional 
exports, horticulture in particular. As a result, a significant non-traditional agricultural export subsector 
has emerged with considerable foreign exchange earned from horticulture crops such as pineapple, 
yam, bananas, cashew nuts, shea nuts, cottonseed, and kola nuts. Additionally, fish products and cocoa 
have seen their exports growing (Kolavalli et al., 2010). Ghana's agricultural sector is characterized by 
smallholdings and traditional practices. Around three-fourths of farm holdings are less than 3 hectares 
in size (Chamberlin 2008). Maize and cassava are the most common smallholder crops. Production 
systems and technology are mainly traditional, based on intercropping and use of simple implements 
and hand tools with little use of modern inputs such as improved varieties and fertilizers and other 
agrochemicals. Crop production is largely rainfed, with less than 1 percent of the cultivated area 
irrigated. Favourable weather conditions and world market prices for cocoa have contributed to recent 
rapid growth in agriculture, with the bulk of the growth coming from area expansion. However, 
productivity in the food crops that smallholders dominate has been rather variable and stagnant in 
many areas. Access to input and output markets has been identified as a key constraint to smallholder 
development (Chamberlin, 2008).  Over the last decade or so, the governme t of Ghana has been trying 
to transform its agricultural sector to include small farmers. Transformative goals for small farmers 
include increased participation in markets and higher productivity, enabled in part by better access to 
and use of input and credit markets. Therefore, reducing access constraints is an important goal in 
Ghana’s current rural development dialogue and one strategy to do so has been the commercial 
development of Farmer-Based Organizations (FBOs) (Salifu et al., 2010).  
Although FBO is somewhat of a catch all term for any form of aggregation of rural dwellers, the 
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common denominator is that these are organizations owned by the individuals using their services. 
According to agribusiness theory (Cook, 1995; Cook and Illiopoulos, 2000; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cook 
and Chaddad, 2004), FBOs can thus be considered as patron-owned (or user-owned) cooperatives, as 
opposed to investor-owned firms. In 2010 there were approximately 10,000 grass-root (or primary) FBOs 
in Ghana, comprising approximately 350,000 farm households (Salifu et al., 2010). Policies promoting 
the commercial development of FBOs have been justified by the need to trigger the development of 
inclusive agri-business that provides social and economic benefits to rural smallholders. Similar policies 
aiming to re-vamp and re-invent cooperatives in order to move towards a more socially responsible 
economy are observed in many other parts of the world (European Commission and EURICSE, 2013). 
However, it is unclear whether FBOs are indeed contributing to promote inclusive agribusiness in Ghana, 
as the health status of many of these organizations appears to be suboptimal.  
In this paper, we use primary data on 500 Ghanaian FBOs collected through semi-structured 
interviews and risky dictator games (RDG) to test the validity of the cooperative life cycle theory and 
formulate a measure of cooperative health. We define cooperative health as the alignment of 
heterogeneity in risk preferences and the effectuation of collective investments. We then use cluster 
and correlation analysis to categorize FBOs on the basis of their health and correlate these typologies 
with various performance indicators. Our findings reveal that organizational health is generally low as 
there are only a few organizations that manage to provide member-farmers with both risk-sharing and 
cost-saving opportunities. Further, healthier FBOs experience stronger growth in membership while 
health is lower in FBOs that have been established for the purpose of benefitting from external 
incentives. The paper proceeds as follows the next section describes the history of smallholder 
cooperation in rural Ghana; the third section sets out the cooperative life cycle framework as 
elaborated by agribusiness scholars; the fourth section describes our data while the fifth section 
presents our empirical results; the paper concludes by linking our results to the theoretical 
framework and deriving policy implications.  
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2. History of smallholder cooperation in Ghana 
In pre-colonial Ghana agricultural production was organized into communities of subsistence 
smallholders governed on the basis of kinship and hierarchical principles (McPhee, 1926; Buell, 1928; 
deGraft-Johnson, 1958; Grischow, 2006). The risk associated with subsistence farming was commonly 
shared within a community through different revolving (or rotating) schemes (Strickland, 1933; Young 
et al., 1981; Tsekpo, 2008; Salifu et al., 2010). These schemes, commonly known as Nnoboa and Susu, 
were meant to facilitate the exchange of labour, food and other resources among community members 
in times of need. Interestingly, this form of traditional schemes for mutual insurance can be still found 
nowadays in Ghana as well as many other parts of Africa, for example: La tontine in Senegal, Les 
greniers villageoises in Burkina Faso and Niger, Idir and Iqub in Ethiopia and so forth (Salifu et al., 2010; 
Francesconi and Ayerakwa, 2011). Although they continue to serve important social protection 
functions, arguably their contribution to agribusiness development has been rather negligible (Salifu et 
al., 2010; Francesconi and Ayerakwa, 2011).  
Colonial authorities recognizing the social importance of these community-based arrangements 
for risk-sharing purposes, decided to leverage them in order to establish cooperatives that could 
facilitate the bulking and commercialization of agricultural products. This approach was viewed as a 
way to guide Ghanaians through a critical stage of economic growth without tearing the social fabric. 
Colonial authorities thus invested in the development of cooperatives to facilitate the extraction of 
agricultural produce (especially cocoa) to be sold on the world market. This investment strategy implied 
a reduction in transaction costs, boosting Ghana’s agricultural production and commercialization, but 
also fostered problems of elite capture. Because investments were often allocated by colonial 
authorities on the basis of political considerations, cooperative leaders became less accountable to 
their member-farmers. Corruption and embezzlement thus became widespread in cooperatives 
discouraging broad-based participation. Yet, when colonialism came to an end in 1957, the newly 
independent state continued to support this highly centralized and inefficient cooperative model 
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through investments in parastatals and by 1960 cooperatives were marketing about 40 percent of the 
total cocoa production. (Strickland, 1933; deGraft-Johnson, 1958; Young et al., 1981; Grischow, 2006; 
Tsekpo, 2008; Salifu et al., 2010). 
This situation began to change in the 1980s when policy reforms led to the gradual 
disengagement of the state from many functions and services related to agricultural production and 
commercialization. Under growing international pressure for liberalization and efficiency-enhancing 
structural adjustment, investor-owned firms (IOFs) were expected to replace parastatals in agricultural 
value chains. However, these expectations were seldom fulfilled: in some cases, the withdrawal of the 
state was tentative at best, leading to minimal change in cooperatives. This was particularly true for key 
value chains such as cocoa. In many other cases where abrupt state withdrawal was not followed by 
the rise of private investments, entire cooperative structures collapsed leading to an institutional 
vacuum, which hampered the participation of smallholders in the market.  
At the onset of the new millennium and with increasing market globalization, these 
institutional caveats became particularly evident. Thus while liberalization may have enabled FBOs to 
actively seek better output market conditions for their members, particularly for cocoa, it has been 
argued that these organizations have largely been left to fend for themselves against new private 
companies entering the market. As the market for cocoa and chocolate outside Ghana is one with 
relatively few large players, value adding is difficult, smaller players such as FBOS are at a disadvantage 
and the market is prone to speculative behaviour.  
Recognition of this institutional vacuum refocused attention on FBOs and particular the need to 
develop new-generation market-oriented cooperatives. The planned transformation of FBOs in Ghana 
was thus essentially driven by the need to address the marginalization of smallholder farmers in global 
markets while avoiding a return to the centralized and inefficient cooperative model of the past. The 
transformation was facilitated by the decision of the Ghanaian government to revise the cooperative 
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law (the Cooperative Societies Decree from 1968) so as to formally recognize FBOs as autonomous 
agribusiness entities. In addition to this, FBOs could be expected to benefit from important external 
incentives. In fact, since FBOs were expected to contribute to a reduction in transaction costs and risks 
associated with agricultural development, FBO membership soon became an essential pre-condition for 
farmers to benefit from such programs. This realization also led to a further increase in the number of 
FBOs (Tsekpo, 2008; Wanyama et al., 2009; Salifu et al., 2010). 
Arguably, the most important example (in terms of budget size) among the incentive schemes 
put in place so far to promote rural development was the agricultural program of the Millennium 
Development Authority (MiDA).
ii
 Between 2008 and 2011, MiDA supported 1,242 FBOs throughout the 
country in order to increase their productivity and commercial competitiveness. In particular, MiDA 
provided the members of selected FBOs with both technical training on agricultural practices and 
starter packs that contained fertilizer, improved seeds, protective clothing and cash. MiDA also 
provided national banks with significant funding to be used as credit collateral for FBOs willing to make 
value adding investments that could enhance their integration in agricultural value chains.  
While the previous paragraphs describe the history of organizations for smallholder 
cooperation in Ghana, we have not assessed the level, extent, or intensity of the collective domain or in 
other words the array of collective activities of an organization that is, the number and type of activities 
that are carried out collectively. It is important to do so because, regardless of their underlying 
purpose, many FBOs appear to be dormant engaging in little or negligible collective action. Clearly, 
having in place the organizational infrastructure does not automatically imply collective action 
(Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Below we describe and further develop the concept of cooperative health and 
explain why it may be compromised.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
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As mentioned, Ghanaian FBOs can be defined as user-owned cooperatives. The analysis of similar 
organizations in the United States led agribusiness scholars to develop the cooperative life cycle 
framework (Cook and Chambers, 2007). In particular, this framework specifies that the health of a 
cooperative evolves according to a life cycle. In simplified terms, this theory states that a cooperative is 
formed when there is an economic justification, subsequently experiences a period of membership 
growth and good performance until problems arise that eventually either lead to the collapse or the re-
invention of the organization. However, since this theory is based on protracted analysis of US-based 
agricultural cooperatives, its validity in different contexts and especially in developing countries 
remains to be ascertained.  
Farmers need an economic justification to self-organize and collective action is often thought of 
as an effective means to reduce transaction costs because it enables the exploitation of important 
economies of scale in accessing markets (Berdégué, 2001 Poulton et al., 2010). Scholars such as Sexton 
and Iskow (1988) and Staatz (1987) specify that the establishment of cooperatives is usually justified by 
the need to better connect farmers to markets. However, it is also clear that when markets are fraught 
with imperfect information this gives rise to externality-like effects (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986) and 
public incentives may be needed to trigger collective action through cooperatives. In line with this 
argument, institutional scholars (Olson, 1965; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001) conclude that in the 
absence of external incentives farmers do not always (nor often) decide to self-organize. This is 
particularly true in Africa where FBOs appear to be established in anticipation or during development 
programs (COPAC, 1995; World Bank, 2007). The economic justification of self-organization of 
smallholders goes hand in hand with an organization design phase. Cooperatives are typically 
established on the basis of equity principles, members’ property rights tend to be vaguely defined, 
allowing for cross-subsidization or patronage defined as the support that a member bestows upon 
another given differential usage of the services provided by  a cooperative  (Cook and Illiopoulos, 2000; 
World Bank, 2007). 
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Following the phase of economic justification and organizational design, cooperatives tend to 
experience a period of growth in membership and good performance due to their ability to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope. As they grow and time passes, FBOs tend to experience 
increased heterogeneity in members’ socio-economic preferences. Although this process contributes to 
increased risk-sharing, under vaguely defined property rights it can also give rise to the free-rider 
problem. This problem arises if some members benefit from an organization without paying the cost 
(Ostrom, 2004). A common example in the context of developing countries is members that obtain 
inputs on credit from their FBO but avoid repayment by selling their agricultural output individually 
(also known as the side-selling problem) (Francesconi and Ruben, 2014). The free-rider problem may 
eventually give rise to collective shirking or in other words the lack of willingness of members to invest 
in/contribute to their organization and the inability of the organization to provide services that connect 
member-farmers to markets.  
 Nilsson et al. (2012) argue that the problems faced by agricultural cooperatives in Europe arose 
when growth in membership led to a transcendence of initial community boundaries, resulting in 
increased member anonymity and the erosion of social capital, which has been defined by Putnam 
(2000) as consisting of social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them. Low levels of social capital induce organizations characterized by vaguely defined property rights 
to invest an increasing amount of resources in monitoring members’ activities and enforcing sanctions. 
However, as monitoring and enforcement costs increase, revenues tend to decrease and to be 
increasingly captured by rural elites. This is what Cook and Chambers (2007) define as the agency-cost 
problem. Therefore, the growth of a FBO is bound to be limited by the rise of either agency-cost or free-
rider problems. The recognition of these problems motivates the decision to either dismantle or re-
invent an organization.     
Overall, this framework suggests that the health of a FBO evolves according to a life cycle 
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whose three main phases are characterized by: 1) start-up incentives and design 2) growth and glory 
and 3) problems (Figure 1). Yet, the definition of cooperative health remains somewhat unclear. Cook 
and Chambers (2007) suggest that indicators of organizational health should capture the degree of 
alignment between financial and non-financial performance. In a similar vein, Ostrom (2011) stated that 
in the developing world the success of collective action organizations depends on a combination of 
social and economic factors.iii Ruben (1997) further qualifies this statement suggesting that the success 
of FBOs in developing countries depends on both risk-sharing and efficiency-enhancing devices. 
Agribusiness scholars recognize that a key function of cooperatives is to reduce on-farm risk (Sexton 
and Iskow, 1988; Cook et al., 2008). Farmers seek to mitigate uncertainty at the level of the farm by 
transferring risk to the organization, in such a way as to spread it among the members. Mazzocco and 
Saini (2012) further explain that in cooperatives, risk-sharing increases with the degree of heterogeneity 
in members’ risk preferences. Heterogeneity in members’ preferences described by Cook and 
Chambers (2007) as the main source of equity and inefficiency in cooperatives may thus be related to 
the attitude to risk. It follows that heterogeneity in members’ risk preferences can either foster risk-
sharing or free-riding. To address the inefficiencies that give rise of the free-rider problem, FBOs need 
to centralize input and output flows through investment in physical (for example warehouses, 
processing equipment, vehicles) and human resources (managers, technicians and so forth). However, 
when efficiency-enhancing investments are effectuated when social capital is low they can result in 
agency-cost problems, leading to elite capture and minimizing risk-sharing opportunities. Hence, we 
conclude that the health of an FBO depends on the degree of alignment between the heterogeneity in 
risk preferences and collective investments (Figure 1).  
 
< FIGURE 1 > 
 
Page 9 of 27
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
The progression of an organization through the life cycle appears purely driven by internal dynamics. 
However, external incentives such as those provided by policy and project interventions for 
establishment and performance of organizations also need to be taken into account. Meinzen-Dick 
(2009) and Hoff and Stiglitz (1993) suggest, for example, that FBOs are often dormant (or passive) in 
developing countries because they were largely established to attract external support and thus lack an 
economic justification while Platteau (2004; 2007) stresses that the external support channelled 
through these organizations has reinforced elite capture in many parts of rural Africa thereby 
compromising leadership.  
 
4. Data 
To test the validity of the framework depicted in Figure 1 in the Ghanaian context we use primary data 
on 500 FBOs collected in 2010 under the direct supervision of one of the authors. The organizations 
sampled for this study were randomly selected from a list compiled by the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MoFA), which included only organizations at the village level (i.e. no unions, 
federations or other forms of apex organizations). Although this list cannot be considered as 
nationally representative, it included 3,052 FBOs out of a total population estimated at approximately 
10,000 units. The list covered six (out of ten) administrative regions, and all three main agro-ecological 
zones of the country (coastal, rainforest, sahelian). The geographic distribution of the 500 FBOs in our 
sample is presented in Table 1. Data collection activities were carried out by a team of 17 MSc students 
from three Ghanaian Universities (Accra, Tamale, and Kumasi), using digital questionnaires and games 
uploaded onto smart-phones.
 
Interviews and games were conducted with three board members 
(president, secretary and treasurer) from each sampled organization.  
 
< TABLE 1 > 
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The board members were first asked a combination of open and structured questions about 
their organizations. In addition to this, the three board members were asked to play a simple game 
aiming to assess the degree of heterogeneity in their risk preferences under equity rules and thus the 
potential for risk-sharing. This game combines classic risk and dictator game theory (see Binswanger, 
1981) into what Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) define as a risky dictator game (RDG). In this type of 
game the behaviour of a player depends on his/her expectation about other players’ behaviour. In this 
game participants could gain real money but could not lose any of their own, as per the Do no 
harm policy applied by the International Food Policy Research Institute for experiments involving 
human beings. This game was designed to estimate the degree of heterogeneity in members’ risk 
preferences in organizations characterized by vaguely defined property rights. As the property 
rights of members of a cooperative tend to be vaguely defined, the degree of heterogeneity in 
members’ risk preferences is expected to provide a proxy measurement for the amount of risk-
sharing taking place in an FBO. Experimental approaches to measure risk preferences have been 
commonly used by economists particularly in settings where one cannot obtain reliable estimates of 
risk preferences through classic survey techniques or eliciting certainty equivalents (Binswanger 1980). 
Game outcomes in symbiotic relationship with survey data have proved extremely useful in explaining 
the clash between the theoretical prediction that self-interested individuals do not act collectively (see 
The tragedy of the commons by Hardin, 1968) and evidence indicating that collective action is instead 
widespread (Ostrom, 2000). 
The game was played as follows. The three board members were asked to play the game 
twice. A first round was played with negligible amounts of money at stake, for demonstration 
purposes, while the outcomes of the second round were used for the analysis. First, the three 
players were split in such a way that they could not see or hear each other. Second, they were 
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explained the rules of the game. Third, they were asked to pick one of the risk options given in Table 
2. Fourth, players were gathered in a central place and a coin was tossed. Fifth, players’ individual 
payoffs were calculated on the basis of their risk choices and the outcome of the coin toss (head 
or tail). Finally, the aggregate payoff was calculated and shared equally (as per the equity rule of 
the game) among the three players.  
The validity of the outcomes of this game - for the purpose of measuring the degree of 
heterogeneity in members’ risk preferences and thus the degree of risk-sharing within an FBO - 
relies on three assumptions. The first assumption is that differences in the risk preferences 
expressed by the three board members provide a good enough representation of the degree of 
heterogeneity in the preferences of all members within an FBO. Technically this assumption is 
valid as members have elected the board of their organization to represent them and their 
interests. Of course empirical reality may differ from this technical reality but our data reveal that 
in over 90 percent of organizations decisions are taken through member-voting; that rule of law is 
assured through a constitution while sanctions are used on members that do not comply with 
these rules and regulations. All these constitute elements of a democracy and ensure the 
representativeness of the centralized authority (see also Grossman and Baldassarri, 2012). The 
second assumption is that FBO members have incomplete knowledge about the preferences of 
other members. The third assumption is that members’ property rights within an FBO are vaguely 
defined. This assumption has been discussed at length in the theoretical framework above.   
 
< TABLE 2 > 
 
The outcomes of the game are presented in Table 3 together with relevant survey data. In 
particular, game outcomes indicate that the average degree of heterogeneity in members’ risk 
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preferences (1.55) is slightly below the median value (1.65), suggesting that FBOs in which 
preferences are rather homogenous prevail. Survey data instead shows that only 25 percent of 
the organizations in our sample had made collective investments of any kind (in physical assets 
and/or human resources). Table 3 also shows that the average organization in our sample 
witnessed a 110 percent growth in membership since establishment. It is important to note that 
the average organization was seven years old and had 35 members at the time we conducted the 
survey. Table 3 also indicates that 16 percent of sampled organizations participated in the MiDA 
program. Since MiDA was the largest support program taking place at the time we collected the 
data for this study, participation in this program can be considered as a proxy for the exposition of 
the FBOs in our sample to external incentives. Finally, board members were asked whether they 
were mostly concerned with problems related to the lack of market-access or social cohesion. 
Responses indicate that 86 percent of the FBOs in our sample are mostly concerned with 
problems of market-access. 
 
< TABLE 3 > 
 
5. Results 
The two indicators describing the degree of heterogeneity in risk preferences and the incidence of 
collective investments are used to perform a cluster analysis (around median values) allowing us to 
categorize FBOs on the basis of their health: homogeneous risk preferences and no collective 
investments (type 1); heterogeneous risk preferences and collective investments (type 2); homogenous 
risk preference and collective investments (type 3a) and heterogeneous risk preferences and no 
collective investments (type 3b). The prevalence each of these four typologies is given in Table 4. In 
particular, this table shows that most FBOs (39 percent) are of type 1 (homogenous risk preferences 
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and no collective investments) while many others FBOs (35 percent) fall in typology 3b and thus 
experience a lack of collective investments and heterogeneous risk preferences. The rest are either of 
type 3a (15 percent) or type 2 (11 percent). Given that typology 2 is supposed to characterize healthy 
organizations, those that provide their members with both risk-sharing (due to heterogeneous risk 
preferences) and cost-saving (due to collective investments) services, we can infer that the health of 
sampled FBOs is generally poor.  
 
< TABLE 4 > 
 
The health typologies presented in Table 4 are subsequently correlated with three indicators 
capturing: i) the participation of an FBO in the MiDA program (as a proxy for external incentives), ii) 
the growth in membership recorded by an FBO since establishment and iii) the type of problem 
predominantly faced by an FBO (access-barriers to markets or lack of social cohesion). Results g i v e n 
i n  T ab l e  5  show that: type 1 FBOs were significantly more likely to participate in the MiDA program 
(and thus to receive external incentives) compared to others. Table 6 shows that type 2 FBOs grew 
significantly more than others w hi l e  T a b l e  7  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h at  FBOs of type 3a and 3b 
are, respectively, significantly less and more likely to be respectively confronted with problems of 
market-access. These correlations stress the validity of the cooperative life cycle framework (as 
depicted in Figure 1) in Ghana. In line with this framework our analysis shows that organizational 
health is lower in FBOs that have been established to attract external support (by the MiDA project) or 
in those organizations that face significant problems. Furthermore our analysis shows that growth in 
membership corresponds to healthier FBOs. 
 
< TABLE 5 > 
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< TABLE 6 > 
 
< TABLE 7 > 
 
These findings thus stress the validity of the life cycle theory in the context of a developing 
country but, more importantly, we have added to this theory by devising a way to assess and measure 
cooperative health in FBOs in developing countries. Importantly, we find that the vast majority of the 
FBOs in our sample appear to be characterized by sub-optimal health and that this low health may 
explain why FBOs are often unable to provide their member-farmers with services that would enhance 
their participation in markets. Our findings do suggest that Ghanaian FBOs have the potential to 
simultaneously provide risk-sharing and efficiency-enhancing benefits to Ghanaian farmers. The 
realization of this potential may however require an important shift in the way FBOs are governed. 
Although incentive schemes can promote the establishment of FBOs, for FBOs to actually perform 
more efforts are required, in particular to prevent the misalignment between heterogeneity in 
members’ risk preferences and collective investments. 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
 
Over the past decade, attention has focused on FBOs as important players in the transformation of 
rural Ghana. The government and donors have been actively promoting the transformation of FBOs 
into new-generation market-oriented cooperatives. Although these efforts are driven by the intention 
to foster socially inclusive agri-business, most FBOs appear to be unable to provide their members 
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with services required for them to participate in markets. To understand why this is so, in this paper, 
we have used data on 500 FBOs to test the validity of the cooperative life cycle and have formulated a 
measure of cooperative health as a combination of heterogeneity in risk preferences and the ability to 
make collective investments.  
We find that though external incentives have motivated farmers to self-organise, cooperative 
health is generally low. Both existing and newly established FBOs appear to either maximise risk-
sharing between members while failing to mobilize resources for collective investments that should 
help member-farmers participate in markets or favour efficiency-enhancing investments while failing 
to enforce the necessary risk-sharing mechanisms to maintain internal cohesion. Only a few 
organisations appear to be able to “walk the line” or align the heterogeneity in members’ risk 
preferences with the level of collective investments. 
In terms of policy implications, more and better efforts need to be made in order to build up 
the managerial capacity of Ghanaian FBOs. This could be done in several ways. For example, in Ethiopia 
the government provides financial support to agricultural cooperatives in order to hire professional 
managers (Francesconi, 2009). Although this strategy reinforced the link between cooperatives and the 
state, it also proved beneficial for the growth of cooperative agribusiness in this country (Francesconi, 
2009). This strategy could be further improved by training these cooperative managers on cooperative 
leadership using the life cycle framework as the main tool. Finally, as market access is clearly identified 
as one of the key problems that FBOs face when trying to service their members, due to for example 
the problem of side-selling, which may mean that the organisation is unable to bulk enough produce to 
negotiate a good price with a buyer, training may need to be given to member-farmers in order for 
them to develop more of a business mentality.  
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Endnotes 
i. http://social.un.org/coopsyear/ 
ii. MiDA was established on the basis of a collaborative agreement between the Ghanaian and US 
governments. 
iii. This statement was made at the 2011 IASC conference held in Hyderabad-India.     
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Tables and Figures. 
 
Figure 1: The cooperative life cycle framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Cook and Chambers (2007) 
Table 1: Geographic distribution of sampled organizations  
Region Number of Organizations Share (%) 
Greater Accra Region 43 8 
Central Region 50 10 
Volta Region 109 22 
Eastern Region 144 29 
Northern Region 93 19 
Brong Ahafo Region 61 12 
Coastal zone 202 40 
Rain Forest zone 205 41 
Sahelian zone 93 19 
TOTAL 500 100 
Source: Author's survey 
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Table 2: Game’s risk choices 
First round (trial) Second round 
Indicator  Heads (lose) Tails (win) Indicator  Heads (lose) Tails (win) 
0 0.5 GHC 0.5 GHC 
1 0.45 GHC 0.95 GHC 
2 0.4 GHC 1.2 GHC 
3 0.35 GHC 1.25 GHC 
4 0.3 GHC 1.5 GHC 
5 0.2 GHC 1.6 GHC 
6 0.1 GHC 1.9 GHC 
7 0 GHC 2 GHC 
0 2.5 GHC 2.5 GHC 
1 2.25 GHC 4.75 GHC 
2 2 GHC 6 GHC 
3 1.75 GHC 6.25 GHC 
4 1.5 GHC 7.5 GHC 
5 1 GHC 8 GHC 
6 0.5 GHC 9.5 GHC 
7 0 GHC 10 GHC 
Source: Binswanger, 1980 
Note: GHC = Ghana cedi (US$1 = 1.45 GHC, April 2010). 
 
 
Table 3: Data descriptives 
Variables Mean (Std.Dev.) Min - Max 
Growth in membership since establishmenta 1.10 (2.08) -0.83 - 14.8 
Organizational problems (1=internal cohesion; 0= market-
access) 
0.14 (0.35) 0 - 1 
Collective investments (1=yes; 0=no) 0.25 (0.43) 0 - 1 
Degree of heterogeneity in risk preferences (σ)b 1.55 (0.75) 0 - 3.33 
Participation in the MiDA program (1=yes; 0=no) 0.16 (0.37) 0 - 1 
Number of observations 500 
Source: Author's data 
a 
given that for a coop i the number of members at establishment is x0, and the current number of members 
at the moment of the survey is xt, growth is equal to: (xt-x0)/x0 
b 
given by the standard deviation, σ, in participants risk preferences for each game 
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Table 4: Organizational typologies 
No. of Observations: 500 Homogeneous risk 
preferences 
Heterogeneous risk 
preferences 
Total 
Collective Investments 15% (type 3a) 11% (type 2) 26% 
No collective Investments 39% (type 1) 35% (type 3b) 74% 
Total 54% 46% 100% 
Source: Author's data 
Table 5: Correlations between organizational typologies and participation in the MiDA program 
No. of observations: 
500 
Participation in MiDA Aggregate participation for 
other typologies 
t-test 
Type 1 0.49 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 2.06** 
Type 2 0.05 (0.22) 0.12 (0.32) -1.81* 
Type 3a 0.09 (0.28) 0.16 (0.36) -1.66* 
Type 3b 0.37 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48) 0.34 
Source: Author's data;  
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses (); * Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at 
the 5% level. 
 
Table 6: correlations between organizational typologies and membership growth 
No. of observations: 
500 
Membership growth Aggregate growth for  
other typologies 
t-test 
Type 1 1.14 (2.27) 1.07 (1.96) 0.32 
Type 2 1.68 (2.38) 1.03 (2.04) 2.15** 
Type 3a 0.81 (1.69) 1.15 (2.14) -1.26 
Type 3b 1.00 (1.90) 1.15 (2.18) -0.77 
Source: Author's data;  
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses (); * Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at 
the 5% level. 
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Table 7: correlations between organizational typologies and problems 
No. of observations: 
500 
Lack of internal cohesion (as 
opposed to marketing problems) 
Lack of internal cohesion 
among other typologies  
t-test 
Type 1 0.42 (0.50) 0.39 (0.49) 0.57 
Type 2 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.31) -0.28 
Type 3a 0.21 (0.41)
 
0.14 (0.34) 1.68* 
Type 3b 0.27 (0.45) 0.37 (0.48) -1.65* 
Source: Author’s data;  
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses (); * Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at 
the 5% level. 
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